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CORPORATE REPORTING AND THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: AN INTERPRETIVE APPRAISAL
ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the enhanced responsibility and full disclosure
issues of corporate reporting from the various perspectives of the constituent
groups. These issues are significant for the accounting profession as it is
the linkpin between the corporation and its constituencies. Our approach is
to provide an overview of corporate reporting by relating our ideas regarding
constituency group information needs to those in the existing literature. The
overriding orientation is that of a pluralistic approach in which corporate
constituencies compete for influence and accounting information and system
resources.
The constituency groups we define are: society, owners, creditors,
government, employees, and customers. We provide an overview of corporate
reporting to these groups, holding in abeyance the current balance of power
and influence among the various interest groups. We conclude that the
profession will have to rise to the challenges created by the explosion in
information technology in this particular market in order to avoid upheaval
and/or imposed regulations.

CORPORATE REPORTING AND THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: AN INTERPRETIVE APPRAISAL
In this paper we examine the enhanced responsibility and full disclosure
issues of corporate reporting from the perspectives of the constituent
groups. We contend that the accounting profession must assume a more active
role in discerning the information needs of the constituents and act as
leaders for enhanced responsibility in the markets for information. Public
accounting firms have started to recognize this challenge and Price Waterhouse
has been the first to call for broadened audit responsibilities (Berton
[1986]).
Real or perceived malfunctions in this market place could have substantial
adverse effects on the efficient allocation of scarce resources. According to
Arthur Young [1985],
the credibility of the accounting profession and of accounting itself
are of paramount importance to the effective functioning of the
capital market .. .Loss of public confidence in either accountants or
accounting will inhibit the free flow of capital and greatly increase
the cost of raising funds. (p. 6)
These issues are important because, due to advances in information
technology, we are now experiencing a new problem with regard to corporate
statements; the problem of addressing the question of need for
,
rather than
the availability of information (Burton [1984] p. 2) (emphases added).
According to Elliot,
As information becomes the linchpin of our economy, there will be
increasing marketplace pressures for it to be measured and
communicated in the most usable form and, most important, for it to
be credible. Accountants and auditors, as the information people,
are sitting astride this challenge. They can enormously enhance the
quality and value of this new information for the public—but only if
they broadly view their powerful skills and actively participate in
this dawning revolution (World , Peat Marwick [1984], p. 21, emphases
added)
.
In addition, the public accounting profession finds itself embroiled in
conflict because its position of public trust with regard to the completeness
and integrity of corporate financial statements is being questioned. In an
unanimous opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court [1986] describes the auditor's role
as follows:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a
corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with
the client ... .This "public watchdog" function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times
and requires complete fidelity to the public trust, (p. 2) (emphasis
added)
Touche Ross [1985] says,
The public accounting profession is under scrutiny. Almost daily we
read business-press allegations of audit failures, competitive
excesses and commercialism. This criticism, in itself a matter of
serious concern, is magnified by lawsuits claiming extensive damages,
by Congressional hearings and by SEC investigations, (p.i)
Deloitte, Haskins and Sells [1985]: "The litigation and claims experience
of the profession as a whole has been somewhat alarming." (p. 1) For
instance, Berton [1985A] says that currently, investors—with the help of the
litigant bar—are seeking scapegoats to blame for stock and investment
losses. If the company in which they've invested goes belly up, lawyers and
their clients are looking for a "deep pocket" in the person of the auditor,
(p. 24).
The public accounting profession can rise to these challenges by
appraising corporate information from the perspective of the information needs
of the various constituencies and by anticipating increased requests for
corporate information.
Purpose of this study
This paper is an attempt to provide an overview of corporate reporting
using an interpretive approach which explicitly recognizes the critical
constituencies of a corporation. Our frame of reference is the corporate
reports of western, capitalistic societies (as opposed to a developing nation
with a labor-intensive economy). We focus on the relationships between the
corporation, its critical constituencies and the accounting profession
regarding the need for and use of information disclosed in corporate reports.
The current status of corporate reporting is the result of a process in
which various constituent groups exercise their power and influence in order
to mold corporate reporting to their own perspective. One way to study the
corporate information market would be to take as given the traditional (status
quo) division of power and influence among the constituencies where a study of
prices, efficiency, and costs could be undertaken. An alternative framework
is to rearrange the division of power and influence so that one can study the
impact of various wealth and power distributions on the accounting system. A
third approach, an interpretive paradigm, is to suppress temporarily, for
discussion's sake, the division of power ana influence among the
constituencies and concentrate on their information needs (Please refer to
Chua [1986], Macintosh [1986] and Mathews [1985]). We approach the issues
from the interpretive paradigm perspective and focus our attention on the
types of information we believe each of the constituencies would request. An
attempt is made to provide a taxonomy of enhanced responsibility for the
accounting profession.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the first section we
discuss the market for corporate information where critical corporate
constituencies and the diverse needs of corporate information users are
presented. In the second section corporate reports are appraised from an
interpretive paradigm perspective. Section three contains the summary and
concluding comments.
I. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE INFORMATION
Consider Figure 1 where we depict the market for corporate information and
identify the users of corporate information as security analysts, public
accountants and corporate constituents.
(FIGURE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE)
We now focus our attention on the information needs of corporate
constituencies, the accounting profession and their relationship with
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corporate reports.
1 . 1 . Corporate Constituencies
We believe that a corporation has six critical constituencies . They
are: (1) society, (2) owners, (3) creditors, (4) employees, (5) government,
2 3
and (6) customers . The types of corporate information that pertain to
each critical constituency are illustrated in Figure 2.
(FIGURE 2 GOES ABOUT HERE)
Social reporting describes corporate efforts towards fullfilling their
obligations to society. Reporting to owners satisfies the disclosure
requirements of the stewardship function and allows the owners to make
rational, economic decisions. It may be tempting to view the creditors as
only concerned with interest income and the eventual repayment of their
principal; however, creditors have a stake in the well-being of the
corporation. We term communications with this group, reporting to creditors .
Corporate communications with employees is termed reporting to employees
even though much of this reporting is paternalistic in tone. Communications
with government is labelled mandated reporting because it is generally
required by law or regulations. Corporate communications with customers and
suppliers is called persuasive because it is primarily directed towards
promoting transactions between these parties and the corporation.
Much of the reporting to owners, creditors and government consists of
similar information, although the intended function of the information may be
different in each case. In addition, the groups illustrated in Figure 1 are
not isolated; they are, in fact, highly interdependent (depicted by the dotted
lines) and much overlap exists in terms of their characteristics and
information needs.
1*2
.
Information Needs of Constituencies and the Corporate Information Market
If the following is true; "Financial statements do not give a complete
picture of the enterprise. They are limited to events and transactions that
FIGURE a
4A
STATIC VIEW OF CORPORATE REPORTING
Direct relationships and information flow that
emanates from the corporation
Interrelationships of segments of the ecosystem
have taken place and that can be expressed in monetary terms." (Arthur
Andersen [1984], p. 5), the question is: what information is relevant and may
be desired by each constituency group? The following is a tentative general
list of the types of decisions made by the corporate constituencies that use
corporate information:
(1) Society—Members of each group are likely to benefit from the information
provided to all other groups as most constituents belong to more than one
group. Therefore, in addition to reports specifically oriented toward each
constituency group, the corporation would seem to have an obligation to
distribute information that shows how the company discharged its obligations
to society. In many instances, the government constituency is expected to
make sure that the parties comply with rules and regulations formulated to
protect society's interests. Government, however, to a great extent, is
influenced by certain components of society that possess significant amounts
of power and property. Therefore, the societal constituent group may be
justified in being concerned about corporation activities that are not
captured in the regulatory system.
(2) Investors/ Owners—Decisions on (a) to buy or sell stock of the company,
(b) how to vote for directors, management policies, and auditors, and
(c) assessing the long-range profitability and survival of the firm;
(3) Creditors—Decisions on (a) to lend funds to the company (commercial
banks, charter bondholders), (b) acquisition of bonds in the market, and
(c) disposal of bonds (ability of firm to service debt, changes in risk, etc.)
(4) Employees—Decisions on (a) to accept or leave employment (job security),
(b) pay negotiations, (c) safety and health, (d) productivity, and
(e) assignments, turnover, fringe benefits.
(5) Government—Decisions on (a) company's compliance with laws and
regulations, (b) to legislate new regulations, and (c) economic policy (e.g.,
value added by the enterprise).
(6) Customers /Suppliers—Decisions on (a) purchasing the company's product or
service, (b) contract negotiations, (c) product safety, (d) quantity and
auality of after-purchase service, and (e) evaluating product price and
quality.
The corporate information marketplace, obviously, is not tranquil.
Because of its unique position in the corporate information marketplace as a
vendor of confidence in the completeness, integrity and relevance of the
attested information, the accounting profession is currently under tremendous
pressure. Berton [1985B] summarizes the situation as "accountants are in the
kitchen and the heat is rising. It's an exciting place to be, but the
accountants may have to get used to wearing asbestos underwear" (p. 25).
Deloitte, Haskins and Sells [1985] is concerned about the environment in
which it practices and the apparent widening of the gap between the
expectations of the public and the performance of its profession (p. 1). The
number of recent business failures and allegations of management fraud has
raised concerns about the system of corporate accountability and the
effectiveness of independent audits (Arthur Andersen [1985], p. 2). Coopers &
Lybrand [1986] put it this way:
Today there is a difference between what the public or financial statement
users expect from accountants and auditors, and what accountants and
auditors believe they are responsible for. Referred to as the
"expectations gap," it challenges accountants to retain public confidence
in financial statements and audit opinions. To do this, it may be
necessary to make changes in financial statement s, auditor
responsibilities and auditor communications (p. 4, emphases added).
In fact, Jennings, Kneer and Reckers [1986] empirically found that auditors do
not always agree with users as to the approximate level of disclosure. The
expectations gap is not surprising since accountants and auditors seem to
regard investor/creditors as the principal constituency. One must question
the propriety of a service profession committed to the public interest when it
declares in advance that it serves a specific constituency .
The public accounting profession needs to maintain its flexibility and
keep its distance from specific groups if it desires to shift its credibility
as social conditions change. Brummet [1985]:
...accountants should measure and report more important and crucial
information about corporations rather than being concerned about the
improvement of their conventional information that is not very
important anyway. I insist that the accounting profession is still
tied up on their definition of assets and liabilities and they
continue to pay homage to the double-entry system that is more than
five centuries old. (emphases added.)
Consequently, the accounting profession must become even more sensitive to
the ways that corporate information can be improved. Therefore, given the
morass of interlocking relationships in the market place for corporate
information, it is essential that we examine the particular information needs
of the various groups as well as the role of the accounting profession in the
production and distribution of corporate information.
II. AN APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT STATE OF CORPORATE REPORTING
In this appraisal of corporate information we rely strongly on the
interpretive paradigm. Since the impact of the corporation's activities and
reporting are felt across the spectrum of all of its constituencies, social
reporting by corporations is discussed first.
2 . 1. Social Reporting
The increased interest in corporate social reporting regarding
responsibilities to society can be traced to a change in perspective of
corporate performance. Anshen [1980] states that the long-run interests of
business in a reasonably open, flexible, and pluralistic society are better
served when business organizations are perceived to adopt an activist posture
toward society' s problems and discontents than when they are perceived to
behave negatively or with indifference. (p. 18)
In the United States there is an increasing number of groups that are
becoming more concerned and involved with corporate behavior. Society is not
content merely with the idea that management should be maximizing shareholder
8wealth, and that corporations are being closely scrutinized as to their social
obligations. In addition, several studies contend that disclosure of social
responsibility Information is, at the very least, advantageous for management
and the other constituents of the corporation. Corporate disclosures of
social impacts (unless they are mandated) in the United States show little
improvement since companies do not seem to be supplying more and better data
to society. In fact, as several studies indicate, the number of
corporations issuing social reports in Australia, France, Germany, Holland,
New Zealand and Australia has increased at a faster rate than it has in the
United States. (Refer to Ullman [1985] for an excellent review of studies in
this area.
)
Mathews [1985] contends that the increased quantity of information would
serve to make the market more efficient. However, the production and
distribution of the incremental information will have a cost, and the burden
of this, at least initially, would have to be borne by the corporation and
eventually passed on to the users.
2 . 2 Reporting to Owners
The fiduciary reporting function of corporations has developed over a long
time and has traditionally focused on transactions of historical nature.
Theoretically, owners are entitled to know the accomplishments of business and
the ways managers are discharging their fiduciary responsibilities. However,
from the very inception of public reporting, there has generally been a
reluctance to be completely open about the results of operations. . Worse,
some managers may even distort or withhold information from the stockholders
in an effort to protect their own interests in such areas as job security,
o
salaries, bonuses, and perks.
There are many types of information that are not reported in financial
statements that would be beneficial to owners. For example, companies issuing
stock provide information in a prospectus that is far more detailed than an
annual report and includes details about the remuneration of officers and
directors, shares granted to them in stock option plans and the number of
shares held by them. Owners would also be interested in how the corporation
gathers information and the assumptions behind the numbers (Bowie [1985]
p. 15). In addition, corporations should be requested to assure the
shareholders that corporate operations are devoid of illegal activities.
2 . 3 Reporting to Creditors
Secondary creditors such as individuals or institutions that purchase
bonds do not seem to have the immediate working working relationships with a
corporation as do direct creditors. The direct creditors such as commercial
banks and other lending institutions generally demand and receive vitually any
information they need or want. In contrast, the secondary creditors find that
when bonds are issued, the corporation typically discloses the information
required by a registration prospectus. However, once the bonds have been
sold, the company's obligation to provide information is met; bondholders do
not even receive an annual report.
In theory, owners and creditors are sophisticated enough to obtain the
information they need from a variety of sources, including financial analysts
and the audited financial reports. In the past, however, some owners and
creditors found themselves in situations that were unpredictable from their
sources of information. Recall that collapses like Penn Central, Braniff
International, Drysdale Securities, ESM Government Securities, INC., and
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago caught most
creditors and investors by surprise when the first indication of any problem
was the default on an interest payment. Regarding Penn-Central , Barrett
[1986] notes that the cash hemorraging was hidden, the financial statements
provided confusing signals, and while insiders had time enough to bail out,
more than 100,000 small investors held onto what they believed to be a safe
investment (p. 171).
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2 . 4. Reporting to Employees
Most corporations have traditionally given the impression that they view
employees merely as another factor of production, an expense that must be
minimized like others in order to maximize profits. Generally, in the United
States, management's attitude toward the labor force and even the lower-level
executives is very hierarchical (Morita 11986] p. 181). Because of this
attitude, most management and employee relationships have developed into
adversarial positions (also see Craft [1984]). Corporations generally do not
disclose information about the contribution that a particular employee group
has nade toward a particular year's profits. Little attempt is made by
management to disclose information on sales projections, demand for the
corporation's products, or the need to retrain certain segments of the work
force whose skills have (will) become obsolete.
It seems that the greater the stress between management and employees, the
higher management's perception of the importance of employee-related
9information (see, for example, Lewis, e_t a_l . [1984] p. 281) As the
attitudes with respect to employee/management relationships undergo change,
more corporations have begun to disclose relevant employee-related
information. In Europe, social reports, which are in effect reports to
employees, are increasing (see, for example, Jaggi [1980], Schreuder [197&]
and [1979], and Most [1977]).
We believe that in the United States there is tremendous room for
improvement in this area. The public accounting profession has an opportunity
to make a strong contribution in developing criteria for employee reporting.
One should be cautioned, however, about the problem of credibility of
management as a critical variable in assessing corporate reports to employees
(Ogan [1976], p. 317). If management's credibility is low, then the
disclosure of the additional information would have the potential to cause
more dissension and discontent within the employees than if management did
11
nothing (also see Craft [1984], p. 108).
2. 5. Mandated Reporting
Mandated reporting to government agencies by corporations is a complex
area to assess because of its constantly changing environment. As a result,
business is faced with increasing requirements of compliance with several laws
and regulations intended to protect the parties involved (society, in many
cases). For example, Jaggi [1980] says that social disclosures are mandated
in France (p. 36) A recent example of the pressure to mandate public
accounting performance in the United States is the Wyden proposal.
Mandated regulations in the United States, while increasing the firms'
required disclosure, appear to have curtailed the accounting alternatives
(Ernst & Whinney [1986], pp. 5-11 and Chow [1983], p. 485). While government
agencies may have reduced the reporting flexibility of firms, most
corporations have not entirely acquitted themselves of the charge that they
look after their own interests and little else. In this regard, Williams
[1980] says:
During the past decade, the ability of business to shape the issues and
limit the governmental response to that which is logical and consistent
with the continuation of a healthy and vital private sector has been
limited, at best. And, at the same time, there has come to be a growing
public sense that business no longer attempts to balance its interest and
the public's, but rather focuses entirely on its narrow objectives, (p. 2)
Reporting to governments and other users of accounting information by
major corporations clearly needs improvement and the accounting profession
needs to take the lead. According to a former chairman of the SEC, Harold
Williams [1979], the role of the accounting profession should be to maintain
standards that
... match not merely what the law requires, and not simply what
government officials advocate, but also the needs and expectations of
the users of financial information. In the last analysis, it is in
the service of the investing public and other users of financial
information to which the accounting profession has been conscripted
(p. 15). (emphasis added.)
12
To the extent that mandated reporting requirements are promulgated to fill
the information needs of the various constituencies, any improvement in
reporting to these groups has the potential to decrease the pressure on
government agencies. This shift would probably result in information being
provided directly to constituencies rather than indirectly through government
mandated regulations.
2. 6 Disclosure Costs
Two issues arise regarding the costs of providing the disclosure that we
propose. The first is an analysis of the cost versus the benefit of the
additional information disclosed. The second is more involved and concerns
the question of who should pay for the incremental costs of disclosure. A
substantial part of the solution to the question of who bears the increased
costs may be found in the spectacular advances in information technology.
Burton and Davidson [1982] state that the dramatic reductions in cost of new
technology have led to substantial changes in the cost accumulation,
processing, and delivery of data within corporations and that technological
changes of such magnitude should also have a profound effect on the reporting
of results outside the corporation to its external constituencies (p. 58). New
technology now permits the dissemination of information through computer
networks, by satellite, and other electronic means. We feel that most of the
information that should/will be demanded by the critical constituencies is
already being produced in some form but not generally distributed.
With the proliferation of low-cost micro computers, the information
disclosure problem may be simplified somewhat by capturing relevant
information on data bases that are magnetically stored. We envision the
additional information to be distributed by computer diskettes accompanying
the printed financial statements or by electronic data networks. This way,
the information may be displayed in various levels of aggregation and the
user(s) would be able to choose the levels of information content from several
13
menus. Thus, the users would be able to evaluate, interpret and use the
information at their own f inancial-abstractness pace, reducing the confounding
12
effects of information overload.
In situations where the information and its use is excludable (minimal
cost to limit use or consumption) we envision the development of a market
mechanism for the production and dissemination of corporate information.
Under this approach, individuals would purchase the information based on their
perception of the cost-benefit relationship. Information not deemed useful
and thus not worth the cost would not be demanded and, accordingly, would not
be produced.
However, for many of our suggestions, the information and its use may be a
public good. Accordingly, the information can be jointly consumed by more
than one individual. This issue of joint consumption arises both between
constituency groups as well as within a constituency. In most instances, the
inability to exclude consumption by others may lead to a free rider problem
both among and within the constituency groups. Once the information is
purchased by one member of the group, the remaining members would choose to be
free riders. Likewise, once one constituency group purchases some information
relevant to other groups, these groups may attempt to use the information
without paying for it. In addition, individuals or groups may not reveal
their preferences for information voluntarily if the information is to be
coercively priced or taxed. This problem may preclude the use of a
traditional market mechanism to provide the types of information that we
advocate. Public sector Intervention may eventually become necessary to
allocate resources for the production of this public good.
2. 7. The challenge for the accounting profession
The changing environment of the market for corporate information led
Burton [1984] to state that auditors could assume a far more interpretive role
and be available as outside experts to users of financial information, to
14
present the data that they—as outside observers with full access to the
firm—believe are most important in understanding the operations of the
business. This is already done in part as an audit procedure related to
analytical review and audit risk analysis
. (p. 3) He further suggests that
accountants have a great opportunity if they accept the imperatives of the new
world they face. Accountants and auditors start with an advantage in the area
of information technology and a strong institutional position. If they see
the profession's business as information and communication, their prospects
are excellent, since that is where the action in database reporting will be.
The manner in which corporations and the accounting profession respond to
calls for enhanced responsibility will indicate the degree of their
committment to be leaders (rather than reactors to pressure) in providing
fully-disclosed, reliable and relevant information. As a SEC commissioner,
Peters [1986], says, the extent to which the profession is willing to devise
and implement far-reaching solutions .. .will reflect the importance we attach
to the reliability of the financial disclosure process and the seriousness
with which we view the current crises (p. 17).
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Corporations are artificial entities, created to serve the interests of
people. Some have grown so large that they have a pervasive effect on society
and on constituencies that extend far beyond corporate shareholders. We
believe that corporations have an obligation to keep all constituencies fully
informed about their activities. Corporations report information to six
constituency groups but much improvement is needed before corporate reporting
begins to have optimal information content. Information important for the
critical constituencies must be produced and disclosed.
Reporting to shareholders is marginally adequate. Financial reporting to
creditors is excellent in a few cases, but virtually nonexistent in others.
Employee reporting is inconsequential and consists only of reports that
15
concern individual's private matters rather than corporate matters. Mandated
reporting needs to be reevaluated and streamlined so that it will not be
voluminous such that it appears to strangle business. Finally, reporting to
society has not yet developed into a meaningful practice.
The accounting profession must acquire the attitude and skills in
anticipating the information needs of the critical constituencies. In
addition, the profession must recognize the inevitability of enhanced
responsibility and assume an active role in charting its course of action.
The costs of the additional or different format disclosure of corporate
information will be of concern to all parties. With the tremendous advances
in information technology, the incremental costs of information disclosure,
such as those proposed in this paper, may not be as high ultimately as some
may believe. Markets for certain information should evolve when the type of
information allows an efficient allocation through an exchange mechanism. In
situations of market failure, other mechanisms might be explored by
considering preferences, rights, and power positions of the constituencies.
Only after each party receives complete, relevant and timely information about
corporate activities can there exist the necessary conditions for an efficient
allocation of resources.
The crucial variable for the success of the type of undertaking proposed
in this paper is an overall, pervasive change in attitude by the parties
involved in recognizing the delicate balance that exists between the critical
constituencies of society and their real or perceived share of the wealth
generated—in this case, at least—by corporate activities.
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FOOTNOTES
-'According to Gotlob [1985], the critical constituencies are those groups
within the environment of an organization that have the ability to affect the
continued well-being (and even survival) of the focal enterprise, either by
witholding important resources from the organization or by imposing unilateral
sanctions upon it.
^Hopwood [1985] suggests employees and customers as groups which should
receive corporate information. Also refer to Chua [1986], Dierkes and Antal
[1985], Cooper and Sherer [1984], Benston[1982] , Herman[1981] , Burchell,
Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes and Nahapiet[1980] , Anshen[1980] , Birnberg[1980]
,
Pomerantz [1980], McDonald and Puxty [1979]; Williams [1980]; Pfeffer and
Salancik [1978], and Harrison [Dec. 1975-Jan. 1976]
^ When the different constituencies of the corporation agree on the
contracts that they enact with the corporation, they do so with the
understanding that each party has been provided with all the relevant
information about the contract and that there is no moral hazard involved. In
addition, if any one of the parties possesses private information and
misrepresent this, then problems of adverse selection arise. Since the
corporation is the entity that is engaged in both wealth and information
production, it is reasonable to contend that the corporation would be more
likely to have information about its own transactions than any other party.
(See, for example, the literature on insider trading and management versus
financial analysts' forecasts and Lambert [1984].) A heroic assumption we
make here is that large corporations have the technical ability to collect,
process, and disseminate all currently available and relevant information that
pertain to their activities.
In addition, the independence of the auditor is being questioned (See, SEC
Commissioner, Cox [1986]). Also, Chatov [1985] says,
If one were starting from point zero today, I think it would be
madness to invent a system where the one to be audited hired the
auditor, bargained with the auditor as to the size of the fee, was
permitted to purchase other management services from the auditor, and
where the auditor in turn had the prime responsibility for setting
the rules and enforcing them and applying sanctions against
themselves.
Empirically, Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1982] found that the users'
perceptions of auditors' nonindependence may have a significant negative
effect on their investment and loan prospects (p. 345).
5 See Mathews [1985]; Maunders and Foley [1984]; Shane and Spicer [1983];
Wiseman [1982]; Trotman and Bradley [1981]; Anderson and Frankle[1980]
;
Belkaoui [1980]; Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes and Nahapiet [1980]; ;
Spicer [1978]; Watts and Zimmerman [1978]; Bradshaw [1978]; and Estes
[1975]and [1973].
6 Refer to Dierkes and Antal [1985], Davey [1985], Trotman and Bailey
[1981], Jaggi [1980], Schreuder [1978] and 11979], Robertson [1978], and Most
[1977].
'Harrison [1976] reported that fiduciary reporting is still predominantly
focused on financial statements that present a limited amount of information
about business operations and the financial situation (p. 29). Harrison also
reports that the authors of The Corporate Report felt that the present
corporate reports have the following drawbacks:
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1. Maximization of short term profit is not the sole aim of modern business
enterprises. But, by making a profit figure the keynote figure of financial
reports, users are encouraged to believe this is the sole aim.
2. The figure of audited profit for the year is presented as being definitive,
although it is well known to be subject to many uncertainties.
3. Since users are encouraged on the basis of short term results, management
may tend to concentrate on such results rather than on the longer view.
A. The format implies that proprietors are the dominant interest and masks
acknowledged responsibilities to other user groups, (p. 30)
The literature in agency theory seems to lend credence to this (refer to
Chow [1982] and especially Baiman [1982] for a review of research in this
area)
.
^Lewis, Parker and Sutcliffe [1984] found that of the aims and reasons for
reporting to employees during the period 1956-1979, there were 21 instances of
reporting to disseminate management propaganda, 28 out of fear of wage
demands, strikes, and competitive disadvantages, and 22 for meeting
information requirements peculiar to employees. Ihere may be some concerns on
the part of management about disclosing relevant information to employees
regarding management actions or their consequences. However, disclosure would
serve as a check and balance system for management, as competent managers
should have no reasons to worry about employees exploiting the disclosed
information. In this regard, Owen [1982] says " For, after all, any decision
which cannot be successfully defended in rational discussion must be a pretty
poor decision" (p. 6).
1
^. (Also refer to McComb [1982] for a listing of the objectives of the
French accounting plan.)
^American Banker
,
"The Week Ahead—Accounting Standards", June 23, 1986.
-L
^(For a forward looking and insightful discussion of this topic, refer to
Burton and Davidson [1982] and Burton [1984].
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